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COMMENTARY
THE COURTS STAND INDICTED IN NEW YORK CITY
A. SMITH* AND H. POLLACK**t
In the past few years the New York City
courts, traditionally among the most venerated
and respected institutions of local government,
have increasingly been subjected to severe crit-
icism. 1 These criticisms reflect the bitterness,
anger and even contempt of the public for
what is perceived as the inefficiency, laziness
or callous stupidity of judges, who are consid-
ered responsible for putting dangerous offend-
ers back on the streets. Public criticism has
come from all parts of the political spectrum,
but the criticism is remarkably consisteit. In
* Professor of Sociology, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, New York, New York
** Professor of Government, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, New York, New York
t A Note on Sources:
The data for this article were drawn primarily
from three sources: contemporary newspaper ac-
counts; official reports and budgets of the City of
New York and its relevant criminal justice agencies;
and extensive personal interviews with the leading
criminal justice practitioners in the city. Our research
was centered on New York, Bronx and Kings Coun-
ties in New York City, since these counties have the
heaviest criminal case loads. Among those inter-
viewed were the district attorneys of these three
counties, the supervising judges and a dozen of the
sitting judges of the criminal parts of the supreme
courts of these counties (Note: In New York, the
supreme court is the lowest state-wide trial court. -
Ed.), the Chief Executive Officer of the Courts of
the City of New York, the Attorney-in-Charge of the
Legal Aid Society of New York City, several senior
officials of the New York City Police Department,
the Deputy Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Correctional Services and a number
of other officials in miscellaneous categories. These
interviews were remarkable in two respects: first for
the candor with which those interviewed spoke (each
interviewee was promised that nothing he said would
be attributed to him by name); and second for the
degree of consensus which emerged, both as to the
state of the criminaljustice system and the immediate
steps which should be taken to alleviate the existing
problems.
I New York Times, Oct. 31, 1974, at 14.
the eyes of the public, the New York courts
stand accused:
1. Judges permit plea bargaining to such an
extent that serious felonies are reduced to
relatively minor charges and trivial punishment
is meted out to dangerous offenders. The re-
sult is that criminals are freed within a short
period of time to return to the community and
repeat their violent acts.
2. Judges indulge in excessive plea bargain-
ing because they are lazy and uncaring, or
because they are so insulated from the realities
of street life that they do not realize what they
are doing, or because as "liberal" political ideo-
logues they consistently elevate the rights of
the defendant over the rights of the commu-
nity.
3. Sentences are wildly disparate, without
rhyme or reason. This is largely due to the
personal failings of the judges.
4. Judges spend too little time on the bench.
They are frequently late or absent, and thus
permit large backlogs of cases to build up in
their courts.
How true are these charges? Are dangerous
persons released into the community by un-
thinking courts? Are judges as inferior a lot of
public servants as recent criticisms make them
appear to be?
I
Unhappily, some of the charges are true.
Dangerous persons are released into the com-
munity largely through plea-bargaining, 2 but
I "Plea Bargains Resolve 8 of 10 Homicide Cases,"
New York Times, Jan. 27, 1975, at 1; "Lower Courts
Are 8ettling 80% of City Felony Cases," New York
Times, Feb. 14, 1975, at 1. The thrust of these articles
is that the courts are releasing dangerous offenders
into the community by accepting guilty pleas to lesser
offenses and then imposing minimal sentences for
these offenses. The effect is to put the criminal back
on the street almost immediately.
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the competence, honesty and integrity of the judges
on the bench have very little to do with the situation.
Were every judge in the criminal courts a
Solomon who worked 60 hours a week, many
of the abuses which the public rightly deplores
would still continue to flourish. The disastrous
state of the New York City courts is caused not
by the personal failings of the judges, but by
numbers: the number of cases compared to
the number of courts and related facilities
which are available to handle them,
The arithmetic is simple. From 1952 to 1974
the total number of regular, housing and tran-
sit policemen in New York City increased from
19,450 to 36,574, or approximately 88%. During
the same period of time the number of judges
sitting in the misdemeanor and felony courts
rose from 91 to 190,' or approximately 108%.
While the number of police and the number of
judges increased in roughly similar proportion,
the number of felony arrests rose from 16,957
to 101,748: a 500% increase. Another way of
saying this is to note that in 1952 every police-
man statistically made .89 felony arrests; in
1974, each officer was responsible for 2,8 felony
arrests. The felony workload of the criminal
courts thus increased six-fold at the same time
that the number of judges available to cope
with the workload barely doubled.4
3 In New York City there aie two courts of criminaljurisdiction: the Criminal Court, which handles mis-
demeanors, and the Supreme Court, which handles
felonies. In 1974, 92 judges were assigned to the
Criminal Court, and 66 were assigned to the Supreme
Court. However, since the Supreme Court felony
load was so great, 16judges from the Criminal Court
were transferred to temporary duty in the Supreme
Court, as were three judges from the Civil Court and
29 judges from the Court of Claims. Altogether,
there were 190judges to handle all the criminal cases
in New York City, but only 66 were permanently as-
signed to felony work. This contrasts with 23 so
assigned in 1952.
4 All figures relating to the number of police are
taken from the ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and the ANNUAL EXPENSE
BUDGETS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. The figures
relating to the number of judges come from the
NEW YORK CITY EXPENSE BUDGET and the annual
NEW YORK CITY OFFICIAL DIRECTORY (popularly
known as the "Green Book"). The figures on felony
arrests come from the ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; those on the felony
workload of the courts came from the Office of the
Chief Administrative Judge of the Supreme Courts
of New York City.
This disparity between the number ofjudges
and the number of potential cases would by
itself be sufficient to seriously overload the
courts. The situation is, unfortunately, further
compounded by the fact that a felony trial in
1974 is a far different procedure from the
felony trial of 1952. Due in large part to a
series of Supreme Court rulings which ex-
tended rights to indigent defendants which
had previously been exercised only by the well-
to-do, felony trial procedure has become sub-
stantially more complex and time-consuming.
Even in 1952, all felony defendants in New
York State were represented by counsel, but
the role of the defense attorney has changed
markedly since then. Pursuant to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Miranda v. Arizona,5 United
States v. Wade,6 and Terry v. Ohio,7 defense
attorneys can and do challenge the admissibility
of confessions, eye witness identifications, the
legality of arrests and attendant searches, and
the propriety of many types of police proce-
dures." In previous years, neither assigned
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
68 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
7392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1 In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United
States Supreme Court held that illegally seized evi-
dence could not be used to obtain a criminal convic-
tion in a state court. Since Mapp, the Court has
attempted to define the scope of this exclusionary
rule.
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court ex-
tended the rule to cover not only physical evidence
as in Mapp, but also confessions obtained during
custodial interrogation without the presence of coun-
sel, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); identi,
fications made at an improperly conducted line-up,
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 318 (1967); and
evidence obtained through illegal eavesdropping and
wiretapping, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
At the same time, however, the Warren Court lowered
the standards for on-the-street police stops and
searches from the traditional "probable cause" to
"reasonable suspicion," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U,S. 1
(1968), and also suggested in Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S, 721 (1969), that mass fingerprinting aimed at
finding a criminal suspect might be permissible with
prior judicial sanction, The Warren Court substan-
tially expanded the protection afforded defendants
in state cases, but balanced this protection by making
it somewhat easier for police to obtain and use
reliable non-testimonial evidence.
Contrary to the expectations of some, the Court
under Chief Justice Warren Burger has not moved
immediately to undo the work of the Warren Court.
Mapp has not been overruled and the exclusionary
1977]
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counsel nor Legal Aid attorneys had the re-
sources or the appellate court encouragement
to undertake such activities. Today they have
both. The result is that felony court judges in
1974 sat an average of seven working days
longer than in 1952, but they handled only 14.8
trials each as compared to 23.3 trials in 1952, a
decrease of 33%.9
These statistics lead to only one conclusion:
the number of cases to be handled has in-
creased faster than the resources available to
handle them. In the last twenty years, there has
been ever-increasing pressure on every crimi-
nal court judge in New York City to clear his
calendar and keep his caseload current. This
pressure has been increased by public aware-
ness of the civil liberties problems of lengthy
pre-trial detentions and by the overcrowding
of remand facilities such as Riker's Island and
the Tombs. Given this pressure, it is under-
standable that plea bargaining, as a short-cut
to the disposition of cases, has been and contin-
ues to be used to excess.
The elimination of plea bargaining, even if
it were possible, is not the answer. Not all plea
rule still applies to illegally seized physical evidence,
illegally extracted confessions, and illegally obtained
identifications. What the Burger Court has done,
however, is to continue the tendency of the Warren
Court to lower the standards for legal police proce-
dures. In Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), the
Court approved a warrantless search which was not
incident to arrest, although the police may have had
probable cause. A warrantless search not incident to
arrest was deemed based on consent absent a showing
that the defendant knew he had a right to refuse
consent in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 318
(1973). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976). An arrest for a traffic violation was held to
constitute grounds for a complete search of the
defendant which yielded illegal drugs, United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). For a full discussion
of these issues see Weintraub & Pollack, The New
Supreme Court and the Police: The Illusion of Change, in
THE AMBIVALENT FORCE (A. Niederhoffer & A.
Blumberg eds. 2d ed. 1976).
The net effect of these decisions has been to
upgrade the legality of police performance at the
state and local level. The erosion of Mapp by the
Burger Court has not as yet permitted a return to
the time when all police conduct and the fruits
thereof went unchallenged in the courts. The result
of this upgrading, however, has been that a consid-
erable amount of court time is spent in pre-trial
motions dealing with the suppression of evidence.
' STATE OF NEW YORK JUDICIAL CONFERENCE RE-
PORTS, 1952, 1974.
bargaining is bad, 0 and the courts cannot and
should not attempt to bring every case to trial
on the original charges. In many instances plea
bargaining is an expeditious way of achieving
justice for all parties. This is especially true in
cases where the arresting officer has over-
charged the defendant, or where a legitimate
complaint is supported by evidence which is
too weak legally to prove the state's case. While
it is true that some defendants through plea
bargaining may get less punishment than they
deserve, it is by no means a certainty that such
defendants would get any punishment at all
were they brought to trial. In a very large
proportion of arrests there are elements of
overcharging and insufficient evidence, either
of which might lead to acquittal." Plea bargain-
ing in such cases may be a desirable alternative.
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that
plea bargaining is frequently abused, and when
it is abused, dangerous criminals may be re-
leased with minimal or no punishment. Such
abuse is usually the result of calendar pressure
and is heaviest at two points in the criminal
justice process: first, at the initial arraignment,
and second, after the case has been awaiting
trial for more than one year. At the initial
arraignment the state, in an effort to dispose
of the case with minimal use of court resources,
will offer the defendant the best bargain he is
likely to receive without suffering a lengthy
pre-trial confinement. 2 In New York City,
10 The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized and upheld the need for plea bargaining in
our criminal justice system:
Disposition of charges after plea discussions
is not only an essential part of the process but a
highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads
to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive
impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial
confinement for those who are denied release
pending trial; it protects the public from those
accused persons who are prone to continue
criminal conduct even while on pre-trial release;
and by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the
rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they
are ultimately imprisoned.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
n Interview with Mario Merola, District Attorney,
Bronx County, New York, (Jan. 9. 1975); interview
with New York City Police Department administra-
tive official, (Feb. 5, 1975).
12 Interviews with Supreme Court justices, New
York, Bronx and Kings Counties, New York, (Janu-
ary and February 1975).
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court administrators select their most flexible,
experienced and secure judges to handle ar-
raignments with the aim of doing justice with-
out "giving away the court," i.e., imposing an
inappropriately minimal sentence. Despite the
good intentions and overall creditable perform-
ance of the arraignment judges, however, dan-
gerous persons do get through and return to
the community to do terrible things. One prob-
lem at arraignment is that suspects frequently
have long arrest records with few or no convic-
tions. How much weight should a judge give to
a record reflecting multiple arrests without
accompanying convictions when so many ar-
rests are of poor quality or of dubious validity?
In addition, judges have commented to the
authors that adequate data on the defendant's
history is not always available to them, either
because the computerized state criminal justice
records are incomplete or because of a lack of
court staff to check on representations made
by the defendant.
Should the defendant refuse the bargain
offered him at arraignment and be considered
dangerous enough to be denied bail, he may
spend up to a year or more in jail awaiting
trial, due to the shortage of court facilities.
The right to a speedy trial, however, is guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution, and
after a year the appellate courts will exert
increasing pressure on the prosecutor to either
try the case or dismiss it.13 At that point, the
prosecutor will frequently offer the defendant
an extremely good bargain in the hope of
getting some kind of conviction, rather than
being forced to dismiss the case altogether. So
frequently does this happen that defendants
who are experienced in the byzantine intracies
of the criminal justice system will deliberately
try to delay going to trial. Officials of the Legal
Aid Society admitted to interviewers that for
the guilty defendant with considerable evidence
against him, there is no better strategy than
delay. The defendant risks very little because
the time he has served in jail will be credited
against his ultimate sentence.
The courts and prosecutors are acutely aware
of the dangers of the abuse of plea bargaining.
11 The Appellate Divisions actually send letters to
the administrative justices of the supreme courts
involved, indicating that they will entertain defend-
ants' motions to dismiss if overripe cases are not
immediately set for trial.
In all the New York City boroughs except
Staten Island, the district attorneys have con-
cluded that their best strategy in response to
the problem of numbers is to concentrate their
resources on handling the most serious crimes,
and to pay only formal attention to lesser
crimes. To that end, in each borough except
Richmond, Major Offense Bureaus (MOB)
have been established to handle serious, violent
crimes. Rating systems have been established
to determine suitability of cases for MOB treat-
ment, taking into consideration such factors as
the amount of violence used, the degree of
injury to victims, the past record of the defend-
ant, and the strength of the state's case. MOB
cases are usually not plea bargained. At the
very least, pleas of guilty will be accepted only
to felony offenses which are quite close to the
offense charged in the indictment. Moreover,
such cases are brought to trial with reasonable
dispatch, and the sentences handed down are
quite severe, normally amounting to lengthy
prison terms.
The results of MOB operations are notewor-
thy. In the Bronx, for example, from July 1,
1973, to July 1, 1974, 97% of all cases prosecuted
by the Major Offense Bureau resulted in con-
victions. Of equal importance, the median time
from arrest to final disposition was 74 days.
Ninety-five percent of the defendants prose-
cuted received prison terms. These impressive
results were made possible by the special han-
dling which MOB cases receive. The police
alert the district attorney's office when a poten-
tial MOB arrest is made. A special assistant
district attorney handles these cases at arraign-
ment and shepherds them through the entire
court process. Special courtrooms and judges
are reserved exclusively for MOB cases.
14
Prosecutorial and court resources are insuf-
ficient, however, to extend MOB treatment to
cases which, though not qualifying for MOB
treatment, may nevertheless be seriously dis-
ruptive to the community. These cases become
the step-children of the criminal justice system,
in part, at least, because of the diversion of
scarce resources to MOB. Even homicide cases
which are not handled by MOB, but rather by
separate divisions within the district attorney's
14 NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROSECUTION MANAGE-
MENT, REPORT TO THE BRONX COUNTY DISTRICT AT-
TORNEY ON THE CASE EVALUATION SYSTEM (1974).
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office and by specially assigned judges, suffer
from an acute lack of resources.
II
Another charge frequently levelled at New
York City judges is that the sentences they
impose are wildly disparate. For very similar
offenses it is alleged that one offender may
receive probation or very little prison time,
while another receives a substantial prison sen-
tence. Again, these problems have been as-
cribed to the personal incompetence of the
incumbents on the bench.
Sentences are very disparate in many cases,
but then, cases are very different also. No two
homicides, robberies, assaults, or burglaries are
really identical. Even if the offense is the same,
the offender is different. The judge must ask a
number of relevant questions: Was the of-
fender known to his victim? How old is the
offender? Does he have a previous record? Did
the victim play any part in the crime? Is the
offender an addict, or an alcoholic? Does the
community or the family have the resources to
help the offender if he is placed on probation?
What is the prognosis for the offender's future
conduct? What was his motive in committing
the crime? These are but some of the variables
which'a judge must consider, and which make
for marked differences in the sentences im-
posed.
An unreported case recently adjudicated in
Manhattan illustrates some of the problems in
this area. A black gypsy cab driver who, for
self-protection, carried a gun for which he had
no permit, returned to his cab from the cafete-
ria in which he had stopped for coffee. He was
accosted by two men and ordered to take them
to Harlem. The cab driver was frightened by
the appearance of the two men and he refused
to take them. The men moved threateningly
toward him and in a panic, the cab driver
pulled out his gun and fired, killing one of the
men. At that moment, an off-duty policeman
passing on the other side of the street heard
the shooting. He pulled out his own gun, fired
a warning shot in the air and ordered the
cabbie to stop shooting. The driver in his panic
did not hear the policeman identify himself,
and heard only the shot which he thought was
directed against him. He whirled and shot at
the policeman, hitting him in the hand. The
cab driver was subsequently arrested and in-
dicted for the murder of the would-be passen-
ger (who, it turned out, had a long record of
cab driver holdups), and for attempted murder
of the policeman.
What is the proper disposition for a case like
this? Does the judge do justice by concentrating
on the offense and ignoring the totality of the
circumstances? Should the judge, for example,
take into consideration the fact that the defend-
ant had no criminal record, was a responsible
family man and a respected member of his
community? Possession of an unlicensed
weapon is illegal, but is it also relevant that
holdups of cab drivers, especially in ghetto
areas, are fairly frequent, and that cabbies are
sometimes killed during such holdups? Would
either justice or the community be served by
an automatic sentence formula decreeing
prison terms for all killings committed with
illegally possessed weapons? After spending fif-
teen months in jail awaiting trial, the cabbie was
permitted to plead guilty to manslaughter and
was released on probation. Those who consider
the sentence fair should realize that when po-
lice statistics are compiled, this will be a case of
murder and attempted murder of a policeman
where the defendant was released on proba-
tion.
The sentences imposed by trial judges may
be disparate, but whether disparity is a problem
depends on one's point of view. To the prison
administrator, such disparity is irritating and
poses problems because of its adverse impact
on inmate morale. 5 If Jones is doing five to
ten years for robbery and Smith is doing one
to three, Jones will be aggrieved. But each may
deserve his sentence from the point of view of
the sitting judge, who attempts to reflect the
needs of the community in his dispositions.
The statutory discretion allowed to judges is
permitted precisely because the courts are ex-
pected to take variables into consideration.
III
Judges are frequently accused of contribut-
ing to the congestion of the courts by working
too few hours. They are said to come in late,
leave early, take excessively long summer vaca-
tions, and utilize every excuse not to hold
court. Such charges are reinforced every time
policemen, complaining witnesses and others
1s Interview with Benjamin Malcolm, Commis-
sioner of Correction, New York City, (June 17, 1976).
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who were ordered to appear at 9:30 A.M. are
forced to sit waiting for an hour until the judge
finally appears. Professor Abraham S. Blum-
berg pointed out that a 1955-1965 survey of
judges sitting in a major criminal court in New
York City revealed that the workload of the
judges was unevenly distributed.16 If this survey
were to be replicated today, the results might
not be very different. Many judges admitted to
the authors that some of their colleagues take
advantage of a system where firing is not easy
and where there are relatively few direct con-
trols over judicial conduct. Nevertheless, the
shirkers are atypical. When a judge fails to
show up in court, he may have slept late or he
may have been playing golf. But he may also
have been hearing motions in chambers, doing
legal research, writing opinions, getting addi-
tional background on a case, negotiating a plea,
arranging for the court appearance of lawyers,
witnesses and others needed in trying a case or
doing a dozen other legitimate chores which
cannot be performed in open court. Further-
more, the judge who handles disproportion-
ately few cases may be one who tries lengthy
cases and gets involved for weeks or months in
the disposition of a single case. The "produc-
tive"judge, on the other hand, may be one who
clears his calendar by giving away the court.
Abuses in the past were more flagrant, but
since the institution of the Administrative
Judge's Office there is tremendous pressure
on all judges to put in an honest day's work. 17
Absences and latenesses are reported promptly,
and the offending judge is called to account,
frequently in ways which are embarassing to
one who has come to expect nothing but defer-
ence from those around him. Those judges
who don't conform may not be fired, but they
can be harassed in other ways -either by trans-
16 A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINALJUSTICE (1974).
17 The Office of Court Administration in New
York City supervises the day-to-day functioning of
the courts. The office compiles statistics on the at-
tendance, workload and productivity of each judge;
the number of cases awaiting trial; and the length of
time required for disposition of cases at various
stages of proceedings. It is also involved in determin-
ing and allocating the court's budget and conducts
ongoing studies to determine the need for changes
in procedure. This office was established in 1974.
Prior to that time similar functions had been per-
formed by the Administrative Judge of the Criminal
Courts, Supreme and Criminal, of the City of New
York, a position which had been established in 1955.
fer to outlying districts or by being given un-
congenial assignments. The number of long
vacationers, race track habitues and golfers has
markedly declined.18 While it is admittedly dif-
ficult to measure judicial productivity, judges
in New York City now sit one and one-half
weeks longer than they did twenty years ago,
and the quality of their performance necessary
to meet appellate court standards has increased
substantially. With some individual exceptions,
New York City's judges, as a group, are in all
likelihood performing at least as well as the
public has a right to expect under the circum-
stances.
IV
If the judges are thus not to blame for the
inadequacies of our criminal courts, what then
are the problems and what should be done to
remedy them? The first most obvious answer is
money. The courts need more money. The
ridiculous disparity between the amounts spent
for the police and other parts of the criminal
justice system must be modified. In New York
City the entire criminal justice system (courts,
corrections, probations) outside of the police
department receives only one-and-a-half per
cent of the city budget. We need more judges,
more courtrooms, more court attendants, and
probably more remand facilities for the short-
term detention of defendants awaiting trial. We
need more probation officers so that pre-sen-
tence reports can be completed expeditiously
without becoming superficial.
To advocate more money for the courts,
however, is like advocating motherhood. No
one will disagree, but no one-not the city,
the state or the federal government-will come
forth with the money. New York City is now
faced with its most critical budget squeeze in
forty years. But even in affluent times, the
courts were shortchanged; few voters, despite
their fear of street crimes, care as much for
the courts as for the state of the subways, the
schools, or even the garbage pickups in their
neighborhoods. The courts simply have no
political clout in budgetary terms.
Why the courts have been so ineffectual in
obtaining a reasonable share of the tax dollar
is not clear, but several answers suggest them-
's Interview with Lester Goodchild, Chief Execu-




selves. In the first place, an agency's annual
appropriation is normally based on its previous
year's budget allocation; increased or decreased
in proportion to the increase or decrease in the
total budget and to the amounts given to other
agencies. To put it another way, if an agency
wishes more than the share of the budget
previously allocated to it, it must show substan-
tial justification. The courts in New York City
have, in fact, kept pace with the police depart-
ment in terms of the increase in numbers of
personnel. 19 The disproportionate increase in
felony arrests, however, has created the urgent
need for an increase in court personnel, an
increase which the courts have simply been
unable to obtain. Their failure to persuade the
budget makers may be due partly to the fact
that a judge is a very expensive commodity.
Each additional supreme court judge in New
York City, including the costs of his courtroom,
attendants, stenographer, and other services,
costs S600,000,20 or the equivalent of approxi-
mately 300 policemen. The need for an addi-
tional judge would have to be very well substan-
tiated-and in political terms this is almost
impossible-to outweigh the appeal of 300 po-
licemen on the streets. It is also much more
difficult to add judgeships, which must be
created by an act of the state legislature. In-
tense interparty negotiations are involved, since
judgeships are most cherished pieces of politi-
cal patronage. In contrast, the number of po-
lice can be expanded simply at the discretion
of the city administration.
The police themselves, moreover, are nu-
merically a much larger group than are the
judges. Given the alliance of the Police Benev-
olent Association with other municipal unions
in New York City, police now constitute a
pressure group to be reckoned with. The
judges have no similar constituency, even
though many of them come out of the political
clubhouses and have close political ties to the
city administration. The police thus have a
substantial advantage when the decision is
made as to where tax dollars should be added
'9 The courts, however, have fallen behind in
dollar allocations. Since 1953 the budget for the
police has increased 900%, while the court budget
has increased only 508%.
20 Office of Court Administration of the City of
New York.
in order to strengthen the criminal justice sys-
tem.
Finally, the public simply does not under-
stand the relationship of the courts to the
police. Since most citizen-court contacts are at
best unpleasant, the courts themselves do noth-
ing to endear themselves to the average citizen.
Even if the citizen is not a defendant, his view
of the courts is jaundiced. If he comes as a
complaining witness, he suffers endless delays
and sharp frustration. As a juror he endures
hours of aimless waiting. As an observer he
experiences unexplained mumbling at the
bench and even more inexplicable, lengthy
pauses in the proceedings while the judge mys-
teriously disappears. To many citizens it ap-
pears that all that is necessary is for the judges
to buckle down and go about their business
more efficiently.
Unless the public is educated to understand
the relationship between street crime and the
shortage of court facilities, money simply will
not be forthcoming. Even recent sharp criticism
of the courts in the press, though misleading,
has been helpful in drawing attention to prob-
lems of which the taxpayer is normally una-
ware. Until political leaders have the courage
to take money away from those parts of the
system which have the support of well-orga-
nized and vocal interest groups, such as the
civil service unions and the highway lobby, and
give it to the courts, the effectiveness of the
courts will not improve.
However, money alone is not the complete
answer. There are other measures which can
be taken to reduce the overcrowded condition
of our courts. To begin with, for many defend-
ants plea bargaining is both a legitimate and
just way of disposing of cases. There is no
need to attempt jury trials for every indictment
or information. What should be avoided is the
pressure to accept pleas and to inordinately
reduced charges simply for the purpose of
clearing the calendar.
Second, efforts should be made to introduce
into the criminal courts an intake procedure
that will divert away from the formal criminal
justice system a host of relatively minor cases
where in all likelihood the punishment for the
defendant would be less than imprisonment.
Consider, for example, the adolescent who is
caught siphoning gas from someone's tank, the
housewife who is arrested for shoplifting, the
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motorist who punched the man who took his
parking space, or other cases of this type. It
should be possible to give such defendants a
prompt hearing before a magistrate, or a law-
yer-referee, at which the defendant, the com-
plaining witness and the arresting officer can
be heard. The formal procedural rules that
normally protect the defendant would not be
observed, but the defendant would enjoy the
benefit of a prompt disposition of his case, the
guarantee of no more than minimal punish-
ment, and recourse to the regular courts should
he feel aggrieved. The hearing officer in such
a case would be entitled to order restitution,
fines, supervision by probation, placement in a
job training program, referral to a rehabilita-
tion program, or whatever similar disposition
might be found appropriate. Enormous
amounts of court time could be saved by such
a diversionary process. There would be no loss
to the community since, in the end, the more
formal criminal adjudicatory process would
achieve no better results. The defendant and
the complaining witness may actually receive
more time and attention in such relatively in-
formal procedures than in a court which is so
hariied that it has no time for petty offenses.
An experimental program along these lines
is currently being mounted in Harlem under
the auspices of the Institute for Mediation and
Conflict Resolution.21 The purpose of the pro-
gram is to handle cases of family disputes and
lesser crimes between friends, relatives and
neighbors which might otherwise have gone to
criminal court. These cases are referred to the
Institute by police officers, either directly from
the scene or from the station house, and are
heard by a panel of three community residents
specially.trained for arbitration work. At least
theoretically, this program is an excellent first
step towards removing minor offenses from
court calendars. It is somewhat limited, how-
ever, in that it deals only with disputes among
21 This is a community agency funded by the New
York Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, employ-
ing mainly people from the Harlem community who
are trained as referees and taught the principles and
techniques of mediating and arbitrating conflicts. See
Weisbrod, The Need for Diversion of Interpersonal
Criminal Complaints: The IMCR Center, (1977) (un-
published master's essay, John Jay College). This is a
pilot project using federal funds which is attempting
to demonstrate the utility and cost effectiveness of a
limited diversionary program.
individuals who are known to each other.
There are many other criminal offenses occur-
ring between strangers which also could be
diverted out of the regular court process into
less formal administrative handling.
A third way of relieving congestion in the
courts is to remove many morals offenses from
the penal code. It is absurd, when the Off
Track Betting Corporation 22 is legally operat-
ing on 125th Street, for the police to be arrest-
ing and processing numbers runners doing
business on the same block. The number of
homosexual arrests is declining, and obscenity
prosecutions are a rarity, but there are still
dozens of prostitutes picked up daily to no end
other than harassment and perhaps the pay-
ment of fines. The women involved consider
these fines to be a business tax, and the fines
probably do not even pay the city for the costs
of processing such cases through the courts.
Too much has been written on the need to
decriminalize marihuana and heroin to recapit-
ulate here, but drug possession cases (as op-
posed to cases of drug-induced crime) are also
exercises in futility. The social price of prose-
cuting morals offenders often is the inability to
prosecute those who commit violent crimes.
A fourth way of uncluttering the courts
would be to make strenuous efforts to improve
the quality of arrests and reduce the degree of
overcharging of arrested persons. One reason
for the excessive number of poor arrests may
be the fact that a good proportion of the time
spent by policemen in processing an arrest and
arraignment is paid for at overtime rates. It
may be very tempting for a policeman who
finds himself particularly squeezed for money
to make an arrest knowing that it will add
approximately $100 to his pay check. In such
cases defendants are usually overcharged so
that they will be arraigned in court rather than
given a desk summons. Arrests of this type are
not normally made for felonies, but are more
likely to result from morals offenses, street
brawls or other incidents which the policeman
might otherwise ignore or handle unofficially. 23
22 The Off Track Betting Corporation is a New
York State instrumentality that accepts bets on
horseracing.
23 It is impossible to document the relationship
between overcharging and the paying of police at
overtime rates during the arraignment process. No
studies have been made and no statistics exist, partly
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To avoid this kind of "bounty hunting,"
prearraignment procedures have been devel-
oped which enable the policeman and the com-
plaining witness to accompany the defendant
to a central facility where the information nec-
essary for arraignment is gathered and the
complaint attested. The defendant is then ar-
raigned without requiring the presence of the
officer or the complaining witness. This proce-
dure not only reduces inconvenience to the
complaining witness (the victim) but also cuts
down the officer's overtime pay about 80% to
90%.
Such programs have been instituted experi-
mentally in some boroughs. Efforts are cur-
rently underway to make them citywide, de-
spite misgivings on the part of the Legal Aid
Society and some court officials. Legal Aid
feels that the officer's presence is required in
relation to the bail hearing at arraignment and
also to facilitate .possible disposition through
plea bargaining at that time. These objections
are valid but could probably be overcome by
carefully designed complaint forms which
would elicit the necessary information. As mat-
ters stand now, even without such gathering of
information, the policeman stands mute ir two-
thirds of the cases processed. Even if an occa-
sional case needed to be held over for further
processing, such a practice would be a vast
improvement over the present system.
A fifth way of streamlining the operations of
the courts would be to remove the judge from
the jury selection process and to re-examine
the process by which pre-trial motions are han-
dled. A Manhattan supreme court judge esti-
mates that one-third of his time is spent injury
selection, one-third in hearing pre-trial mo-
tions, and only one-third in actually trying
cases. Jury selection frequently is a long and
tortuous process, but it is an essential one.
While there may be no need to change the
method of selection, it is not essential for the
judge personally to supervise the picking of
because this is an extremely sensitive issue within the
police department. Since almost all arraignments are
on overtime, there is no way of determining a cause
and effect relationship between overtime and a par-
ticular group of charges. The hypothesis set forth by
the authors is based on interviews, conducted on a
not-for-attribution basis, with police administrators
who are convinced that the easy availability of over-
time pay leads to a tendency to overcharge criminal
offenders.
the jury. The voir dire examination and the
assignment and exercise of challenges by the
prosecutor and defense attorneys can proceed
equally well under the direction of a lawyer-
referee, while the judge himself can be occu-
pied with other matters.
The problem presented by pre-trial motions
is more complex. As a consequence of recent
United States Supreme Court criminal proce-
dure decisions ,24 it is possible for attorneys to
challenge the prosecution's case in many ways.
Motions may be made to suppress illegally
seized evidence, improperly obtained confes-
sions, and unduly prejudicial evidence, such as
mention of the defendant's past record. Just as
in the case of jury selection, the ultimate out-
come of the trial may depend on the decisions
made in these pre-trial motion hearings, Prob-
ably very few attorneys would be willing to
have such motions heard by anyone other than
the trial judge, so that the substitution of a
lawyer-referee would be impossible. Neverthe-
less, some time could be saved by scheduling
the hearings of such motions so as to minimize
delay. For example, attorneys could be re-
quired to furnish the court with a complete list
of all motions to be argued. The lawyers and
evidence needed for these pleadings could then
be gathered together and handled expedi-
tiously, and jurors, witnesses and others not
needed could be excused. Discovery rules could
be expanded so that the prosecution would be
required to make full disclosure to the defense
of all evidence in its possession. This would
enable the defense attorneys to carefully plan
and organize their motions .25 The current sys-
tem frequently is quite disorganized, with law-
yers making motions at the last moment and
thereby throwing the trial schedule into disar-
ray.
Finally, it is time for knowledgeable officials
to examine the impact of those laws which
24 See note 8 supra.
2- There is no constitutional compulsion on prose-
cutors to make such complete disclosure. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Such a practice
can, however, be instituted as a procedural rule of the
court with the consent of the parties involved. It can
be argued that some prosecutors would resist giving
the defense more information than is legally re-
quired. We have found, however, that many harried
prosecutors in the overcrowded urban courts, are
open to any reasonable suggestion that would expe-
dite the flow of cases and relieve them from the in-
tense pressure of an impossible agenda.
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impose prison sentences without possibility of
plea bargaining for particular offenses. For
example, under the Rockefeller Drug Laws26
as initially passed, a conviction for drug posses-
sion meant that a judge was required to impose
a prison sentence with a substantial minimum
and a maximum of life. Such defendants were
not permitted to plead guilty before trial to
anything less than an A-3 drug felony, which
provided for a mandatory prison sentence of a
minimum of one year to a maximum of life. In
theory, these drug laws were designed to pre-
vent permissive judges from "coddling" de-
fendants. In practice, they introduced elements
of rigidity into the sentencing process which
created injustices to defendants and great ad-
ministrative problems for prosecutors and the
courts. The New York state legislature recently
modified some provisions of the Rockefeller
Drug Laws, largely at the behest of the police
and district attorneys. Now it is possible for
possessors of small amounts of narcotics to
plead guilty to lesser offenses and escape parole
supervision for life.27 Police and prosecutors
had requested the change because in the past
three years court calendars became increasingly
clogged with cases involving petty drug offend-
ers.
There are, however, provisions of the Rock-
efeller Laws which still mandate compulsory
sentences for serious drug offenders and habit-
ual felons. Superficially, it seems appropriate
for the legislature to insist that such defend-
ants, as a matter of public policy, go to prison.
In practice, however, on a case-by-case basis,
there is frequently sufficient ambiguity or miti-
gation that it is desirable that more discretion
remain in the hands of the judge, The impor-
tant point is that whenever the legislature man-
dates prison sentences it must concurrently make
provision for increased numbers of prosecutors
and judges. If it does not, the result will be
26 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220 (Consol. 1975).
27 Id.
that those cases for which prison sentences are
mandated will monopolize the resources of the
system and squeeze out all other cases.
It is also essential that the legislature concern
itself immediately with the problem of correc-
tional facilities. If court reform is to be effec-
tuated, that is, if the courts are to deal more
effectively with dangerous felons, then there
must be some place to send such defendants
after conviction. (Whatever the shortcomings
of commitment may be, there is consensus that
the commitment of some individuals is neces-
sary for the protection of the community.) For
some years, the population of New York State's
prisons declined sharply. Recently, however,
the number of inmates increased: from 11,250
in 1972 to 15,450 in 1975.28 New York's correc-
tional institutions will soon be operating at
capacity, and if the legislature and the public
hope to make court reform a reality, planning
for correctional facilities must start immedi-
ately, since there is a considerable lead time
for the construction of such facilities.
Many of these suggestions for court reform
can be effectuated with very little extra money,
although substantial relief for the system prob-
ably depends on budget reallocations. Before
anything constructive can be done, however,
the search for a scapegoat, the all too human
desire to point the finger at somebody else,
must stop. No part of the criminal justice
system functions perfectly, no part is totally
responsible for the failings of the system, and
no part functions in a vacuum. The courts may
stand indicted by the public, but the verdict on
the judges, at least on the whole, has to be "not
guilty." The public protest over the shortcom-
ings of the system can, however, be put to
positive and constructive use if political leaders
have the honesty and integrity to do what
serious observers of the criminal justice system
know needs to be done.
28 New York State Division of Correctional Ser-
vices, personal communication to the authors.
